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Abstract
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking
crises. The conventional view is that the domestic financial turmoil is the consequence of for-
eign retaliation, although there is no clear empirical evidence on “classic” default penalties.
This paper emphasizes instead a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises,
building on two natural assumptions: (i) government bonds represent a source of liquidity
for the domestic private sector; (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic
and foreign creditors in the event of default. In this context, external debt emerges even in
the absence of classic penalties and government default is countercyclical, triggers a liquidity
crunch, and amplifies output volatility. In addition, a financial reform that involves a sub-
stitution of government bonds with privately-sourced liquidity instruments could backfire
by restricting government’s access to foreign credit.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking
crises. Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show that sovereign default was, in fact, a good predictor
of a banking crisis in many emerging countries during the period from 1980 to 2000.1 The con-
ventional view interprets domestic turmoil as an indirect consequence of foreign retaliation, for
example trade sanctions or exclusion from international financial markets.2 Yet, this interpre-
tation is controversial. First, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence supporting the application
of “classic” penalties.3 Second, in recent sovereign crises (e.g., Argentina 2001 and Russia 1998)
government default had a direct “balance-sheet” effect on domestic financial institutions, which
were major holders of public debt (Mishkin, 2006). In this paper, I study the direct connection
between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises abstracting from external penalties.
The model builds on two natural assumptions for emerging markets. First, public debt represents
a source of liquidity for the private sector. Specifically, domestic firms need to refinance their
projects in the future but are not able to access spot credit markets due to limited enforcement
of creditors’ rights. Firms then save in government bonds, either directly or indirectly through
the banking sector, to hoard a reserve of liquidity. This aspect of the model is consistent with the
negative correlation observed in the data between creditors’ rights protection and banks’ holdings
of government debt.4 Second, the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign
bondholders in the event of default. This assumption, which hinges on both the anonymity and
the increasing integration of secondary markets for government bonds, is consistent with the
large haircuts suffered by domestic financial institutions during recent debt crises.
The implications of these two assumptions are clear. Sovereign default has opposing effects on
the domestic economy as, on the one hand, it avoids a transfer of domestic resources to foreign
creditors while, on the other, it generates a liquidity crisis that disrupts private investment and
lowers domestic production. The trade-off faced by the government then explains the emergence
of sovereign debt even in the absence of foreign penalties. Nevertheless, a default might occur in
some states. In particular, sovereign default is countercyclical, as a drop in aggregate productivity
lowers the cost of triggering a liquidity crisis, and has an amplification effect on the business cycle,
as the shortage of liquidity dampens private investment and output.
1These authors apply a methodology similar to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and show that the probability
of a banking crisis conditional on a sovereign default in the same year or in the year before is statistically larger
than the unconditional probability while this is not the case for the probability of a sovereign default conditional
on a banking crisis.
2The nature of costs associated with default has been studied extensively since Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
and Bulow and Rogoff (1989). Scholars agree that debt repayment hinges on a sovereign’s willingness to avoid
the cost of a default given that existing legal arrangements do not provide sufficient protection of creditors’ rights
(due to the jurisprudential principle of “sovereign immunity”). See Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Bulow
and Rogoff (1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright
(2002), Amador (2004), Yue (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), among others. Eaton and
Fernandez (1995), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and Panizza et al. (2009) survey this literature.
3See Borensztein and Panizza (2008).
4See Kumhof and Tanner (2005).
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Having established the link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises, the paper discusses a
novel implication of financial reforms; namely, reforms do not necessarily raise domestic welfare
and, in some cases, can backfire on welfare. Consider a reform that enables domestic firms
to hedge their future refinancing needs using some type of contingent contracts rather than
resorting to precautionary savings in non-contingent government bonds. Conventional wisdom
suggests that this reform must have a positive effect on welfare as it allows firms to reallocate
efficiently liquidity across future states. However, this interpretation considers only one aspect of
the reform. The reverse aspect of it is that the consequent decline in domestic holdings of public
bonds makes government’s default less costly and, therefore, it might restrict the government’s
prior access to foreign credit. In conclusion, an assessment that focuses exclusively on the
efficiency gains for the private sector could overestimate the true effect of a financial reform by
failing to recognize that the reform could involve a reallocation of capital from the public to the
private sector, which would be particularly detrimental in countries with large returns on public
infrastructures.
Two strands of the literature are brought together in this paper. First, the motivation for holding
government bonds is based on the corporate finance approach to liquidity hoarding (e.g., Holm-
strom and Tirole, 1998). According to these authors, whenever in the economy there is a demand
for liquid assets which cannot be satisfied by the private sector due to a lack of commitment, the
government can intervene by issuing government bonds, which are implicitly guaranteed by the
government’s ability to commit agents’ income through taxation. A common counterargument,
however, is that integration with a mature market, having a virtually unbounded financial capac-
ity, could alleviate the need for government intervention in the economy; indeed, foreign bonds
represent a perfect substitute for government bonds. Yet, this paper shows that this is not true
in general and, therefore, the existence of a market for government bonds can enhance liquidity
even in open economies. More specifically, a slight and realistic modification of Holmstrom and
Tirole’s framework, that is, the inclusion of sovereign risk, implies that foreign bonds are no
longer perfect substitutes for government bonds. The intuition is that the government can ma-
nipulate the returns on public bonds and make them procyclical, allowing domestic bondholders
to efficiently reallocate resources across states of nature.
The second strand of the literature that is closely related to this paper includes a number of
recent papers that focus on the direct consequences of sovereign default on the domestic private
sector (e.g., Broner and Ventura, 2011, 2008; Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Gennaioli et al.,
2009).5 These papers have in common with mine the assumption that government’s repayment
is non-discriminatory across domestic and foreign creditors, but they emphasize different impli-
cations: the welfare and distributional effects of default, the political process governing sovereign
repayment and the interaction between private and public capital flows, respectively. My paper
concentrates on the emergence of a liquidity crisis in the event of default and on the disruption
5See also Sandleris (2008) and Basu (2008).
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of private investment.
With regard to the empirical evidence, the paper documents that sovereign debt crises are as-
sociated with domestic liquidity crises. Using sectoral data for a panel of 59 emerging countries
over the period from 1980 to 2000, the evidence shows that sovereign defaults exert a differen-
tial effect across manufacturing sectors, which is both statistically and economically significant,
suggesting that financially dependent industries experience sharper contractions. Furthermore,
the evidence shows that the domestic liquidity crisis is not fully explained by the contraction in
foreign credit to the private sector in the event of a sovereign default.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses
the main results. Section 3 addresses the consequences of a financial reform in this framework.
Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and section 5 concludes.
2 A model of sovereign risk and liquidity crises
This section first characterizes a stylized economy where government debt represents a source of
liquidity due to frictions in private credit markets. It then analyzes the implications of sovereign
risk on private investment and aggregate output.
2.1 Technology
Consider a small open economy that lasts for three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. There is a single
homogenous good which is produced by a continuum of risky investment projects. Investment
in each project j costs one unit of the good in t = 0 and returns θAj in t = 2 where θ and Aj
denote two independent shocks realized in t = 1. θ captures an aggregate shock, which affects all
projects equally and takes values θH > 1 with probability piH ≡ pi(θH) (good state) and θL < 1
with probability piL ≡ pi(θL) = 1− piH (bad state). For simplicity, normalize the expected value
of the aggregate shock to one, that is, piHθH + piLθL = 1. Aj captures an idiosyncratic shock,
which affects each project individually and takes values A > 0 if the project is lucky and zero
if the project is unlucky. Each project has an equal probability of being lucky or unlucky. In
the latter case, the project admits an additional investment with variable size, i, which returns
θρ i in t = 2. Setting A/2 > 1 and θL ρ > 1, both date 0 and date 1 investments are profitable.
Figure 1 describes the timing of investment projects.
2.2 Agents and Preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals with mass one who have zero initial
endowment, consume only at date 2 and are risk neutral. There are two types of individuals:
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Figure 1: Timing of investment projects
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entrepreneurs (firms) and workers, both with mass one half. Entrepreneurs have access to the
investment technology and each one can start a single project. Workers, on the other hand,
have no access to the investment technology, but derive income w at date 1. There is also a
benevolent government that maximizes the average welfare of domestic individuals. At date 0,
the government has access to a public investment project with rate of return φ > 1 and maximum
size g¯.
2.3 Financial Frictions
The economy is financially integrated with an international financial market (IFM), which is risk
neutral, has deep pockets and can lend/borrow at a zero interest rate. As the economy has zero
initial endowment, both the entrepreneurs and the government borrow from the IFM to finance
their projects. Let’s now discuss the type of financial frictions existing in this economy. First,
entrepreneurs have limited access to credit due to weak enforcement of creditors’ rights, which
reflects the inability of courts of law to seize the entire value of a debtor’s assets.
Assumption 1 Entrepreneurs can pledge only a fraction γ of expected revenues, while workers
cannot commit their future income.
It is well known that financial frictions influence financial decisions in many ways.6 Here, I focus
on the demand for liquidity assuming (i) γA/2 > 1 and (ii) γ θHρ < 1. These two conditions
imply, respectively, that date 0 investment is profitable for the IFM, but date 1 investment
6Since the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958), financial frictions and their consequences have
attracted a growing literature. Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) provide two excellent surveys. A necessarily
incomplete list of past contributions include: Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) on
the link between credit cycles and business cycles; Matsuyama (2004), Caballero et al. (2008) on international
capital flows and global imbalances; Aghion et al. (2004), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Mendoza (2006)
on emerging market crises and sudden stops.
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is not. Hence, unlucky entrepreneurs cannot borrow on the spot market to finance additional
investment.
Firms could meet their refinancing needs by negotiating a contingent contract with the IFM,
which promises a positive transfer in the case of adverse expenditure shock and a negative
transfer in the alternative case. However, for the time being, I restrict this possibility.
Assumption 2 Entrepreneurs cannot enter into contingent contracts with the IFM.
Assumption 1 and 2 together imply that firms need to save for future investment, and they
can do so only by purchasing non-contingent bonds. In this integrated economy, entrepreneurs
can choose between a foreign bond issued by the IFM and a public bond issued by the domestic
government. The government, indeed, issues a one-period bond in t = 0 to finance the investment
in the public project and repays it by collecting lump-sum taxes at date 1. Sovereign risk arises
whenever the government cannot commit to repay in the future.
Assumption 3 The government commits to repay its debt with probability piG.
If piG = 1, there is full commitment, and the government always repays. If piG = 0, there is full
discretion, and the government can choose whether to repay to maximize the welfare of domestic
individuals. Following Broner and Ventura (2011), I consider that in the event of a default the
government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors.
Assumption 4 The government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors.
Assumption 4 is consistent with the large haircuts suffered by domestic financial institutions
on government bonds during recent debt crises (e.g., Russia 1998 and Argentina 2001). It also
reflects the recent development of liquid secondary markets for sovereign bonds, which makes
the gathering of informations on individual bondholders both unfeasible and inefficient for the
government.7
3 Equilibrium
This section solves for the competitive equilibrium of the model under two opposite regimes: the
case of full commitment by the government (piG = 1) and the case of full discretion (piG = 0). The
7Suppose the government could discriminate among domestic and foreign bondholders. Expecting a default
on their bond holdings, foreigners would always unfold their positions before maturity by selling bonds on the
secondary market to domestics, which have the incentive to buy the bond at any non-negative discount since they
know the government has no incentive to default on domestic debt. This way, foreigners receive de facto their
payment. Hence, if the government wants to avoid the repayment of foreigners, it must commit to default on all
bond holders indiscriminately, for instance by not gathering information on secondary market transactions. By
doing so, the government gains an additional degree of freedom and, as shown in the next section, can implement
a contingent repayment policy that benefits domestic agents. The following quote from Reinhart et al. (2003) is
enlightening: “the view that external debt is completely separable from domestically issued debt is dead wrong”
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comparison between the two cases makes clear why domestic agents buy government bonds rather
than foreign bonds and the connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises.
3.1 Equilibrium with government commitment
At date 0, the representative entrepreneur borrows d from the IFM and saves in government and
foreign bonds up to a face value b and f so as to maximize the expected profit
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yl(θ) + yu(θ)
2
)
− d (1)
where yl(θ) = θ A+ (b+ f − τ) and yu(θ) = θ ρ(b+ f − τ) denote, respectively, the output from
a lucky and an unlucky project. Notice that I have implicitly imposed that on date 1 unlucky
entrepreneurs fully reinvest in the project, that is, i = b+f−τ . This is without loss of generality
given that the additional investment has strictly positive net returns. The budget constraint of
the entrepreneur is
1 + b+ f = d (2)
where both government and foreign bonds have unit price and the initial investment in the
project equals one. Limited contract enforcement restrains date 0 borrowing by imposing
d ≤ γ
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yl(θ) + yu(θ)
2
)
. (3)
Maximization of (1) subject to (2)-(3) yields a corner solution where the borrowing constraint
is binding and government and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. This follows from the fact
that the expected return on each of the two bonds is higher than the cost of borrowing, that is,
ρ¯ ≡ (1 + ρ)/2 > 1. In particular, the entrepreneur’s saving in the two bonds satisfies
b+ f =
γ
(
A
2 − ρ¯ τ
)− 1
1− γ ρ¯ . (4)
Aggregation across individuals implies that the average income of entrepreneurs is YE(θ) =(
yl(θ) + yu(θ)
)
/2 − d, and the average income of workers is YW = w − τ . The problem of the
government then consists in choosing the public investment g to maximize the expected value of
social welfare ∑
θ
pi(θ)W (θ) =
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
1
2
YE(θ) +
1
2
YW + φ g
)
subject to date 0 and date 1 budget constraints, that is, B = g and τ = B respectively. Because
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the government undertakes the public investment only if the social return from it, given by the
marginal product of the project minus the marginal cost of taxation, is positive, in equilibrium
we get
g =
 g¯ if φ ≥
1
2
(
1 + (1−γ)ρ¯1−γρ¯
)
0 if φ < 12
(
1 + (1−γ)ρ¯1−γρ¯
) .
Finally, market clearing imposes that there is equality between supply and demand for govern-
ment bonds, that is, g = B = 1/2 b + b∗ where b∗ denotes the amount of government bonds
purchased by the IFM. Henceforth, consider that public investment has positive net returns, and
thus g = g¯, and that the demand for bonds by domestic entrepreneurs is strictly lower than the
supply of government bonds, that is, g¯ > 1/2(b+f). This restriction ensures that the government
needs to borrow from abroad and makes the sovereign risk problem interesting.
3.2 Equilibrium with sovereign risk
Assume now that the government cannot commit to repay. In the absence of discrimination
between domestic and foreign creditors, the government faces a clear trade-off at the moment
of repayment. On one hand, debt repayment involves an efficient reallocation from workers to
entrepreneurs, which raises aggregate investment, but, on the other hand, it requires a transfer
to the IFM, which reduces the resources available for domestic consumption.
Let e ∈ {0, 1} denote the repayment choice of the government, where e = 1 indicates repayment
and e = 0 indicates default. Repayment occurs only if the average income gain of entrepreneurs
(LHS) compensates the average income loss of workers (RHS), or
YE(θ, e = 1)− YE(θ, e = 0) ≥ YW (e = 0)− YW (e = 1) (5)
where YE(θ, e) =
(
yl(θ, e) + yu(θ, e)
)
/2 − d denotes the average income of entrepreneurs, which
depends on the policy e through the face value of government bonds and taxation as shown
by
yl(θ, e) = θ A+ f + e (b− τ) and yu(θ, e) = θ ρ
(
f + e(b− τ)),
while YW (e) = w − e τ denotes the average income of workers.
By substituting for τ = 1/2 b + b∗ using the government’s budget constraint and the market
clearing condition on date 1, it is easy to see that, for a given level of the external debt b∗,
the LHS of (5) increases with aggregate productivity; indeed, a higher θ raises the return from
reallocating wealth from workers to entrepreneurs. Therefore, there may be situations where
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debt repayment is procyclical, that is, e = 1 if θ = θH and e = 0 if θ = θL. This actually turns
out to be the case in equilibrium.
On date 0, each entrepreneur observes the holdings of government bonds of other domestic
entrepreneurs and the IFM. If the entrepreneur expects the government to repay in all future
states, he will be indifferent between saving in domestic and foreign bonds and his level of saving
will be given by (4), as before. If instead the entrepreneur expects the government to repay only
in the good state, he will choose {d, b, f} to maximize
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yl(θ, e) + yu(θ, e)
2
)
− d (6)
subject to the budget constraint
1 + f + piH b = d, (7)
where the price of government bonds is actuarial fair as agents are risk neutral, and the borrowing
constraint
d ≤ γ
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yl(θ, e) + yu(θ, e)
2
)
. (8)
Maximization of (6) subject to (7)-(8) implies that domestic entrepreneurs save exclusively in
domestic government bonds. Indeed, the repayment of government bonds is now contingent on
the state of the economy and domestic firms save in government bonds to reallocate liquidity to
the state in which the productivity of additional investment is higher. More formally, a simple
rearrangement of (6) shows that by saving in government bonds domestic entrepreneurs receive
an expected return ρ¯H ≡ (1+θHρ)/2 which is greater than the expected return on foreign bonds,
ρ¯ = (1+ρ)/2. As long as both returns exceed the borrowing rate, constraint (8) must be binding
and the following condition holds:
b =
γ
(
A
2 − piH ρ¯H τ
)− 1
piH (1− γρ¯H) and f = 0. (9)
Given the choice of entrepreneurs, the government chooses g to maximize the expected value of
social welfare ∑
θ
pi(θ)W (θ, e) =
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
1
2
YE(θ, e) +
1
2
YW (e) + φ g
)
(10)
subject to date 0 and date 1 budget constraints, that is, piHB = g and eτ = eB respectively.
In the absence of commitment, however, debt repayment must be incentive compatible at least
when θ = θH to induce individuals to buy government bonds, and the following constraint must
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be satisfied in equilibrium:
YE(θH , e = 1)− YE(θH , e = 0) ≥ YW (e = 0)− YW (e = 1). (11)
Assuming that the social return on public investment is positive,8 maximization of (10) implies
the incentive-compatibility constraint (11) is binding and, using the market clearing condition
B = 1/2 b+ b∗, external debt is equal to
b∗ =
(
ρ¯H − 1
ρ¯H + 1
)
b
2
.
The explanation of this result is quite intuitive. At this level of foreign borrowing, the government
implicitly commits to repay only in the good state of the economy, thus benefitting domestic
entrepreneurs who can shift liquidity to the most productive state by saving in government bonds.
Furthermore, the investment in public project and the social return on it are maximized.
3.3 Discussion
The previous model justifies the emergence of sovereign debt in the absence of classic penalties. It
also establishes a connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises that disrupt private
investment and amplify output volatility. Both results arise as a consequence of the fact that
public debt serves as a repository of liquidity to the domestic private sector. Given that generality
has been sacrificed in favor of analytical simplicity, a detailed discussion of the main aspects of
the model is required.
The model extends to the case of open economies the common argument, formalized by Holm-
strom and Tirole (1998), that government debt represents a source of liquidity for the economy.
The justification of the original argument is that whenever there is a demand for liquid as-
sets in the economy and the private sector cannot supply a sufficient amount of assets due to
a lack of commitment, the government can intervene by issuing government bonds, which are
implicitly guaranteed by the government’s ability to commit agents’ income through taxation.
Arguably, however, when the economy is financially integrated with a large financial market, the
need for government intervention is somewhat reduced; indeed, foreign bonds represent a perfect
substitute for government bonds. Yet, when sovereign risk is considered, the two assets become
imperfectly substitutable; indeed, government bonds allow domestic firms to reallocate efficiently
wealth across states of nature. Admittedly, risk aversion, not in this model, could play a cru-
cial role and, in fact, domestic agents would not hold domestic government bonds if they were
8As before, the social return on public investment is positive whenever the marginal product from the project
exceeds the implied cost of taxation, i.e., φ ≥ 1
2
“
1 +
(1−γ)ρ¯H
1−γρ¯H
”
. In addition, I assume that the upper bound
on public investment g¯ is sufficiently high to ensure that the incentive-compatibility constraint can be binding in
equilibrium.
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sufficiently averse to risk.9 The nature of liquidity needs then becomes crucial. In particular,
if agents save liquidity to invest in the future, they prefer portfolios that perform better when
the economic outlook is good, and new investment opportunities are about to come. In such a
case, government bonds constitute a better investment strategy. On the contrary, if they save to
finance future consumption, they rather choose portfolios with countercyclical returns to hedge
against adverse income shocks (e.g., wage cuts, unemployment).10
As a matter of fact, government bonds are commonly held by financial institutions while firms
rely on banks to manage their liquidity needs (e.g. through cash deposits or credit lines). In
particular, empirical evidence suggests that government bonds typically constitute a large frac-
tion of domestic banks’ assets with higher figures corresponding to developing countries and,
among this group, to countries with weak creditors’ rights protection (Reinhart et al., 2003; and
Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). This observation, however, is not inconsistent with the model. Con-
sider a slightly modified framework including a competitive banking sector that borrows from
the IFM and lends to domestic firms. This setup, suggested by Gennaioli et al. (2009), is clearly
equivalent to the previous one whenever there is no commitment problem between banks and
firms (i.e., banks can monitor projects), but there is a commitment problem between banks and
the IFM (i.e., banks can pledge only a fraction of their assets to foreign creditors).11 Hence,
the two frameworks have no major differences in terms of main results, although the second
interpretation provides a more compelling description of reality.12
In the model, government debt enhances private liquidity because it allows agents to redistribute
wealth from taxpayers to entrepreneurs in the intermediate period. Alternatively, we could
consider that the government could transfer wealth through taxation. This possibility, which
was implicitly ruled out in the model, would make sovereign debt unsustainable; indeed, the
government could default on debt to avoid the repayment of foreign bondholders and, nonetheless,
transfer resources to entrepreneurs by taxing workers. This type of redistribution, however,
is arguably not feasible due to either political costs or the reluctance of distressed agents to
accede publicly-sponsored financing that could reveal information to the market (an example of
that is the scarce success to the Fed discounted window facility during the recent US crisis).
Furthermore, the assumption of non-discrimination in taxation is a common assumption in the
literature (Broner and Ventura, 2011; Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Gennaioli et al., 2009).
9However, the preference for government bonds is robust to low level of risk aversion.
10In the model, the choice between domestic and foreign bonds arises from the optimizing behavior of domestic
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it could be argued that governments often resort to financial repression to place their
debt with domestic financial institutions. In this case, the consequence of a sovereign default thus far described
will be at play, notwithstanding the actual willingness of domestic agents to hold government bonds.
11The equivalence between the two frameworks is evident when we consider that each bank lends to just one
firm.
12In particular, the inclusion of a banking sector that holds government bonds and grants loans to firms can
justify the observation of interest rate spikes in the event of default; indeed, a default on government bonds could
weaken banks’ balance sheets and force banks to cut back on credit to private sector in order to reduce their
leverage. This credit crunch ultimately could cause tighter competition for funds by firms and, in the presence of
decreasing returns, mounting interest rates.
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The need for public supply of liquidity hinges on the absence of a private market for contingent
assets. This assumption, which is taken as a given in the model, can be easily justified considering
that the idiosyncratic expenditure shock is private information, and agents cannot write contracts
contingent on it. The next section relaxes this assumption and studies the implications arising
from a gradual expansion of individuals’ access to contingent contracts.
4 Financial reforms
In the late 1990’s, the US federal debt paydown raised practitioners’ worries that a declining
volume of government bonds could restrain the ability of the private sector to hoard liquidity
and spurred the development of alternative liquidity-enhancing financial instruments (Reinhart
and Sack, 2000; BIS, 2000; Fleming, 2001). Twisting this argument, one could argue that the
recent expansion of over-the-counter markets in emerging economies, which enhanced the ability
of firms to insure against future liquidity shocks using a wide range of new instruments (IMF,
2004), will possibly reduce the domestic appetite for public bonds as a repository of liquidity
and, eventually, limit government’s access to foreign credit. This section discusses the welfare
implications that arise from this type of financial reform.
Assumption 2 imposed that firms could not enter into contingent contracts with the IFM and
could refinance their investment only by deploying previous savings in non-contingent bonds.
Relaxing this assumption, suppose there are two types of domestic firms: good firms, which can
trade contingent contracts, and bad firms, which cannot.13 A reform that expands derivative
markets in the economy can then be mimicked by an exogenous increase in the fraction of good
firms.
Assumption 5 Let λ denote the fraction of good firms in the economy, that is, firms that can
enter into a contract contingent on the expenditure shock.
As previously shown, bad firms maximize their expected profits by saving in government bonds
up to
b =
γ
(
A
2 − piH ρ¯H τ
)− 1
piH (1− γρ¯H) , (12)
13One interpretation for good and bad firms is that the former are well-regulated and transparent firms with
foreseeable cash-flows from their assets while the latter are badly regulated and opaque firms holding assets with
uncertain values.
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which is equivalent to (9), and derive expected income∑
θ
pi(θ)Y BE (θ, e) = (13)
=
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yBl (θ, e) + y
B
u (θ, e)
2
)
− dB
=
A
2
+ piH(ρ¯H − 1)b− 1− piH ρ¯Hτ
where I have substituted for dB = 1 + piHb, and the fact that, in equilibrium, the government
repayment policy is procyclical (i.e., e = 1 if θ = θH and e = 0 if θ = θL).
Good firms, on the other hand, can save in a foreign security that is contingent on the aggregate
productivity shock, as government bonds, but also on the idiosyncratic expenditure shock. This
type of securities will naturally arise in equilibrium (provided foreign markets can observe the
idiosyncratic shock to firms) as it maximizes firms’ profits by allowing them to shift liquidity
both across aggregate and idiosyncratic states. Let x denote the amount of foreign securities
purchased by each good firm and let q = piH/2 be the actuarial fair price of each foreign security.
Good firms maximize their expected profits by purchasing foreign securities up to
x =
γ
(
A
2 − piH ρ¯H τ
)− 1
piH
(
1+γ
2 − γρ¯H
)
and receive expected income∑
θ
pi(θ)Y GE (θ, e) = (14)
=
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
yGl (θ, e) + y
G
u (θ, e)
2
)
− dG
=
A
2
+ piH
(
θHρ− 1
2
)
x− 1− piH ρ¯Hτ
where I have substituted for dG = 1 + piH/2 x, and e = 1 if θ = θH and e = 0 if θ = θL.
Given that x > b since γ < 1 and (ρ¯H − 1) = (θHρ− 1)/2, conditions (13) and (14) imply that
good firms receive higher expected income than bad firms. Not surprisingly, the ability to trade
contingent securities improves firms’ efficiency in allocating wealth across states of nature. Thus,
a reform that expands the fraction λ of good firms within the economy increases the expected
income of the private sector.
Let’s now study the implications of this reform on the government’s access to foreign credit.
The problem of the government is to choose the investment g to maximize the expected social
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welfare
∑
θ
pi(θ)W (θ, e) =
∑
θ
pi(θ)
(
λ
2
Y GE (θ, e) +
1− λ
2
Y BE (θ, e) + YW (e) + φ g
)
(15)
subject to the budget balance conditions g = piH
(
1−λ
2 b+ b
∗) and τ = 1−λ2 b+b∗ and the incentive-
compatibility constraint
1− λ
2
(
Y BE (θ, e = 1)− Y BE (θ, e = 0)
)
≥ λ
2
(
Y GE (θ, e = 0)− Y GE (θ, e = 1)
)
+ (16)
+
(
YW (e = 0)− YW (e = 1)
)
.
Suppose again that public investment yields a positive social return.14 As discussed before, the
government will borrow up to the point in which the incentive-compatibility constraint (16) is
binding to maximize public investment and, therefore,
b∗ =
(
ρ¯H − 1
ρ¯H + 1
)
(1− λ)
2
b. (17)
Equation (17) shows that an increase in λ restrains the government’s access to foreign credit
and, therefore, the size of public investment. The welfare consequences of the reform, hence,
are ambiguous; indeed, substitution of (17) into (15) implies that social welfare increases with λ
only if the marginal benefit to the private sector,
∑
θ pi(θ)(Y
G
E (θ, e) − Y BE (θ, e)) is greater than
the foregone return on public investment, [piHφ+ d (
∑
θ pi(θ)W (θ, e)) /dτ ] · ∂b∗/∂λ.
4.1 Discussion
The previous section delivers a simple but powerful result. The common presumption that a com-
plete market for private claims necessarily raises welfare might not be robust to the inclusion of
an interaction between private and public debt markets. In particular, the efficiency gains in the
allocation of capital across private agents might overestimate the real effect of the reform, which
could involve a reallocation of capital from the public to the private sector. This could be partic-
ularly detrimental in poor countries with large returns on public infrastructures. Strong policy
prescriptions, however, are undoubtedly misplaced in this simple environment. For instance, a
relaxation of the benevolent government assumption yields diametrically opposite implications.
In such a case, welfare rises when the government borrows less and, therefore, the improvement
in domestic financial markets will have a beneficial disciplining effect on public expenditure.15
Far from making normative statements, this paper suggests that financial reforms deliver novel
14This is ensured by the condition imposed in the previous section, i.e., φ ≥ 1
2
“
1 +
(1−γ)ρ¯H
1−γρ¯H
”
.
15I am grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested this interpretation.
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implications on the composition of capital flows.
An alternative interpretation of the model suggests that governments might oppose financial
liberalization and resort to some form of financial repression to sustain domestic holdings of
government debt. Mishkin (2006) reports the case of Argentina where bank reserve requirements
clearly privileged government bonds by classifying them as “being the least risky of all assets
that a bank could hold” and by successively raising the share of government bonds in total
reserves to allow the central government to collocate additional debt. This example suggests
that inefficient institutions tend to be particularly persistent for reasons that differ from the ones
already discussed in the literature, which stress the role of initial conditions that are extremely
costly to revert or political economy reasons to maintain the status quo.
5 Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises: empirical evi-
dence
This section documents that sovereign debt crises are associated with liquidity crises. The
empirical evidence suggests that sovereign defaults prompt sharper contractions in industries
that depend on external sources of finance. The evidence also shows that the domestic liquidity
crisis in the event of default cannot be fully ascribed to the decline in foreign credit, in line with
the previous model.
I test the distinct impact of sovereign default across manufacturing industries using the following
empirical model,
gi,c,t = αi,c + λi,t + µc,t +
(
βF FDi + βX Xi
)
·Dc,t + i,c,t,
where gi,c,t denotes the value-added growth in industry i of country c in time t, αi,c is a industry-
country fixed effect that captures the growth trend along the time sample in each industry and
country pair, λi,t is a sector-time fixed effect that captures global sector-specific shocks in each pe-
riod and µc,t is a country-time fixed effect that captures country-specific macroeconomic shocks,
and, therefore, includes the average effect of sovereign default on manufacturing growth.
The variable of interest is the interaction term between a sovereign default indicator Dc,t and
a sectoral measure of financial dependence FDi. Given that FDi takes higher values when
an industry shows greater financial dependence, a negative value for βF suggests that financial
dependent industries experience sharper contractions in the event of default. Spurious estimates
for βF are controlled for by including a vector Xi of alternative industry characteristics, namely,
capital intensity, skill intensity and export orientation.
Throughout, coefficients βF and βX are estimated using a fixed-effect estimator, after eliminating
industry-time and country-time effects by subtracting industry-time and country-time averages
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to all variables prior to estimation.
5.1 Data
Data on value added at the industry level are obtained from the UNIDO INDSTAT3 2005
database. The original database includes 28 sectors at the 3-digit ISIC classification over a
long time period for a large number of developed and developing countries. Data (in current
US dollars) are first converted in constant prices using the US GDP deflator, sourced from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006, and then log differenced to obtain the growth
rate. The large amount of noise, due to misreporting and sporadic observations, is filtered using
common procedures for these data.16 First, I drop those observations for which the growth rate
of value added fall in the top and bottom two point five percent of the distribution. Second, I
remove time spells with less than five consecutive observations for each industry-country pair.
Third, I exclude all country-year pairs reporting data for less than 10 sectors.
Financial dependence, FDi, is measured as the median share of investment not financed with
internal cash flow in industry i. Data on this index are sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007) who
report the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) index at the 3-digit ISIC level and are based on
US public companies balance sheet information. As argued by Rajan and Zingales, the focus
on US data permits isolation of technological differences across sectors that are invariant across
countries.
Capital intensity, Ki, and skill intensity, Hi, are measured, respectively, as the ratio of real
capital stock on value added in industry i and the ratio of nonproduction worker wages to total
wages in industry i, averaged over the time sample. These data are taken from the NBER
manufacturing productivity database and converted to match the ISIC classification scheme by
means of a concordance table.
Export orientation, Expi, is measured as the average ratio of exports on output in industry i over
the time sample. The source is Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). To ease interpretation, all industry
indices are normalized such that they have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Default episodes, Dc,t, are indicated by a dummy variable that takes value one in the first year
after the government’s announcement.17 As in most of the empirical sovereign debt literature,
the source of data used to define default episodes is the Standard and Poor’s database. A list of
default episodes included in the sample is provided in the appendix.
To guarantee parameter stability within the sample, I focus only on developing countries, using
the World Bank classification of low, lower middle and upper middle income countries. The final
16See Borensztein and Panizza (2006).
17Since the exact time of default is difficult to identify, I extend the definition of default to the first two year
after the government’s announcement and to the first three years. In both cases, the estimate of coefficient βF
remains negative and statistically significant, albeit it moves towards zero as the default window expands.
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dataset includes 28 manufacturing sectors in a cross-section of 59 developing countries over the
period 1980 to 2000.
5.2 Results
Table 1 reports fixed-effect estimates relative to the 1980 to 1990 and the 1990 to 2000 sam-
ples (columns 1- 4). The interaction between the default dummy and the financial dependence
index enters with a negative sign in all specifications but is statistically significant only in the
sub-period 1990 to 2000. Arguably, this result does not reject the theoretical model. Indeed,
a key assumption of the model, namely the non-discrimination between foreign and domestic
bondholders, suits more realistically the institutional set-up of sovereign debt markets in the
1990s. Indeed, it is only during the 1990s, as a consequence of the Brady plan, that the share of
debt issued in anonymous bond markets began to soar in emerging countries while before most
sovereign borrowing was granted in the form of syndicated bank loans.
With respect to the 1990s, the point estimate of coefficient β4 is also economically significant. In
fact, industries that are one standard deviation more financial dependent than the median indus-
try experience a four percentage point decline in their relative growth rate. The last column of
table 1 also shows that this effect is robust to the inclusion of additional industry characteristics.
Table 1: Fixed-Effect Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
80-90 80-90 90-00 90-00 90-00
Dc,t · FDi -0.002 -0.001 -0.042** -0.043** -0.043**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Dc,t ·Ki 0.022* -0.003
(0.011) (0.019)
Dc,t ·Hi -0.002 -0.009
(0.010) (0.016)
Dc,t · Expi,c 0.105 -0.459
(0.391) (0.730)
SSc,t · FDi -0.023**
(0.010)
Obs. 9332 7913 7988 7239 7701
Industries 28 28 28 28 28
Countries 53 40 51 42 49
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, re-
spectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
reported within parenthesis. Sector-time and country-time
fixed effects were removed prior to estimation by mean dif-
ferencing.
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During the 1990s, however, the importance of foreign credit to the private sector also increased.
One might argue that the trigger of the liquidity crisis lies in the drop of foreign loans to the
domestic private sector rather than in the default on domestically held bonds. In fact, Arteta and
Hale (2008) provide evidence of a significant decline in foreign credit to the private sector during
default episodes. To control for this alternative explanation, I include in the baseline regression
an interaction term between the financial dependence index and a dummy capturing sudden stop
episodes. Sudden stop episodes, SSc,t, are defined as a five percent decline in net financial inflows
relative to GDP, as in Levchenko and Mauro (2006), and mainly reflect reversion in bank loans
and trade credit. Nonetheless, column 5 in table 1 shows that a sovereign default episode still
exerts a significantly stronger effect on financial dependent industries, which exceeds the average
(relative) contraction experienced by the same industries during a sudden stop episode. Hence,
this evidence shows that the domestic liquidity crisis is not fully explained by the contraction in
foreign credit to the private sector.
6 Conclusion
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with financial turmoil and
liquidity crises throughout the economy. This connection is suggested by both anecdotal and
empirical evidence. In particular, default episodes appear to lead banking crises. However, there
is no clear evidence supporting the application of foreign penalties when default occurs.
This paper, then, proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity and
banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers a standard
unwillingness-to-pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private contracts is limited
and, as a result, public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii) the government cannot discrimi-
nate between domestic and foreign agents. The main result from the model is that external debt
might emerge even in the absence of classic default penalties. Indeed, the prospect of triggering a
liquidity crisis throughout the economy restores the ex-post incentive for the government to repay.
Nonetheless, liquidity crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the govern-
ment chooses to default to avoid the repayment of foreign agents. Empirical evidence consistent
with the connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises is also provided.
This paper finally discusses a novel implication of financial reforms in the economy. The common
presumption that a complete market for private claims necessarily raises welfare might not be
robust to the inclusion of an interaction between private and public debt markets. In particular,
the efficiency gains in the allocation of capital across private agents might overestimate the
real effect of the reform, which can involve a reallocation of capital from the public to the
private sector, which is particularly detrimental in poor countries with large returns on public
infrastructures. In particular, the model provides implications on the composition of capital
flows whose analysis constitutes a fruitful area of future research.
17
References
Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P., and Banerjee, A. (2004). Financial development and the instability
of open economies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(6):1077–1106.
Aguiar, M. and Gopinath, G. (2006). Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account.
Journal of International Economics, 69(1):64–83.
Amador, M. (2004). A political model sovereign debt repayment. 2004 Meeting Papers 762,
Society for Economic Dynamics.
Arellano, C. (2008). Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies. American
Economic Review, 98(3):690–712.
Arteta, C. and Hale, G. (2008). Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector. Journal
of International Economics, 74(1):53–69.
Basu, S. (2008). Sovereign debt and domestic economic fragility. MIT. Mimeo.
Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1989). Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations. The
American Economic Review, 79(1):14–31.
BIS (2000). International banking and financial market developments. BIS Quarterly Review,
Bank for International Settlements.
Borensztein, E. and Panizza, U. (2006). Do sovereign defaults hurt exporters? RES Working
Papers 1018, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Borensztein, E. and Panizza, U. (2008). The Cost of Default. IMF Working Papers 08/238,
International Monetary Fund.
Broner, F. and Ventura, J. (2008). Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization. Universitat
Pompeu Fabra. Mimeo.
Broner, F. and Ventura, J. (2011). Globalization and Risk Sharing. The Review of Economic
Studies, 78(1):49–82.
Bulow, J. and Rogoff, K. (1989). Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget? American Economic
Review, 79(1):43–50.
Caballero, R., Farhi, E., and Gourinchas, P. (2008). An Equilibrium Model of “Global Imbal-
ances” and Low Interest Rates. The American Economic Review, 98(1):358–393.
Caballero, R. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2001). International and domestic collateral constraints
in a model of emerging market crises. Journal of Monetary Economics, 48(3):513–548.
Cole, H. L. and Kehoe, P. J. (1998). Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general reputations.
International Economic Review, 39(1):55–70.
18
Eaton, J. and Fernandez, R. (1995). Chapter 39 sovereign debt. volume 3 of Handbook of
International Economics, pages 2031 – 2077. Elsevier.
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M. (1981). Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical
analysis. The Review of Economic Studies, 48(2):289–309.
Fernandez, R. and Rosenthal, R. W. (1990). Strategic models of sovereign-debt renegotiations.
Review of Economic Studies, 57(3):331–49.
Fleming, M. J. (2001). Financial market implications of the federal debt paydown. Staff Reports
120, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., and Rossi, S. (2009). Institutions, public debt and foreign finance.
Economics Working Papers 1170, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra.
Grossman, H. I. and Van Huyck, J. B. (1988). Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable
default, repudiation, and reputation. American Economic Review, 78(5):1088–97.
Guembel, A. and Sussman, O. (2009). Sovereign debt without default penalties. Review of
Economic Studies, 76(4):1297–1320.
Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1998). Private and public supply of liquidity. Journal of Political
Economy, 106(1):1–40.
Hubbard, R. (1998). Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment. Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 36(1):193–225.
IMF (2004). Emerging local securities and derivatives markets. World Economic and Financial
Surveys, International Monetary Fund.
Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C. (1999). The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance
of Payments Crises. American Economic Review, 89(3):473–500.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit cycles. The Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211–
248.
Kletzer, K. M. and Wright, B. D. (2000). Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter. American
Economic Review, 90(3):621–639.
Kroszner, R., Laeven, L., and Klingebiel, D. (2007). Banking crises, financial dependence, and
growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(1):187–228.
Kumhof, M. and Tanner, E. (2005). Government debt: A key role in financial intermediation.
IMF Working Papers 05/57, International Monetary Fund.
Levchenko, A. A. and Mauro, P. (2006). Do some forms of financial flows help protect from
sudden stops? IMF Working Papers 06/202, International Monetary Fund.
19
Matsuyama, K. (2004). Financial market globalization, symmetry-breaking, and endogenous
inequality of nations. Econometrica, 72(3):853–884.
Mendoza, E. (2006). Endogenous Sudden Stops in a Business Cycle Model With Collateral
Constraints: A Fisherian Deflation of Tobin’s Q. NBER Working Paper.
Mishkin, F. S. (2006). The Next Great Globalization. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory
of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3):261–297.
Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M. (2001). Trade and production, 1976-99. Policy Research Working
Paper Series 2701, The World Bank.
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., and Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The economics and law of sovereign
debt and default. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3):651–98.
Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review, 88(3):559–86.
Reinhart, C. M., Rogoff, K. S., and Savastano, M. A. (2003). Debt intolerance. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 34(2003-1):1–74.
Reinhart, V. and Sack, B. (2000). The economic consequences of disappearing government debt.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 31(2000-2):163–220.
Sandleris, G. (2008). Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 76(2):267–275.
Stein, J. C. (2003). Agency, information and corporate investment. In Constantinides, G., Harris,
M., and Stulz, R. M., editors, Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Elsevier.
Sturzenegger, F. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2006). Debt defaults and lessons from a decade of crises.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wright, M. (2002). Reputation and sovereign debt. Mimeo. Stanford.
Yue, V. Z. (2005). Sovereign default and debt renegotiation. 2005 Meeting Papers 138, Society
for Economic Dynamics.
20
Table 2: Default episodes in the sample
Country Default year Country Default year
ARG 1989 PAN 1983
BOL 1986 PAN 1987
BOL 1989 PER 1983
CHL 1983 PHL 1983
CRI 1981 POL 1981
CRI 1984 RUS 1998
ECU 1982 SEN 1990
ECU 1999 SEN 1992
EGY 1984 SLV 1981
ETH 1991 TUR 1982
GTM 1986 TZA 1984
HRV 1992 URY 1983
JAM 1987 URY 1987
JOR 1989 URY 1990
KEN 1994 VEN 1983
LKA 1996 VEN 1990
MAR 1986 VEN 1995
MDG 1981 ZAF 1985
MDG 1986 ZAF 1989
MEX 1982 ZAF 1993
MKD 1992
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